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In one of its boldest initiatives, the Constitution Revision Com-
mission has proposed adding one small word to the Florida Consti-
tution-one small word which would prohibit sexual discrimination
in Florida as a matter of state constitutional law. The word "sex"
would be added to the second sentence of article I, section 2. That
sentence would then read: "No person shall be deprived of any right
because of race, religion, sex, or physical handicap."' This proposal
will be Revision No. 2 on the November ballot.
This concept-equality of rights, opportunities, and treatment for
both sexes-is an idea whose time has come. Enormous progress has
been made at both the state and federal levels through legislation
and judicial decisions. But much remains to be done. The four-
teenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
"[n]o State shall . . .deny to any person. . . the equal protection
of the laws." But the United States Supreme Court has thus far
refused to rule sex a suspect classification, 2 which would require a
showing of a compelling state interest before discriminatory classifi-
cations would be upheld. As a result, discrimination against women
as a class continues.
The value of clear policy statements like the proposed federal
equal rights amendment and Revision No. 2 is inestimable. Women
in increasing numbers are entering the work force, marrying later,
delaying or refusing to have children, and generally asserting more
1. Fla. C.R.C., Rev. Fla. Const., Ballot Packages & Ballot Language, Revision No. 2 (May
11, 1978), 33 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. app. (May 5, 1978). For the complete text of art. I, § 2, see
Appendix to this issue.
This provision, like the proposed federal equal rights amendment and the prohibitions
against sex discrimination already in the constitutions of sixteen states, would be applicable
equally to women and men. While women historically have undoubtedly been the more
discriminated against, discrimination against men on the basis of sex does exist and would
of course be prohibited.
2. "Suspect class" is a term of art in constitutional law. Once a group has been designated
as suspect, any legislation impacting on that group is subject to strict judicial scrutiny. The
more severe the scrutiny, the less likely that legislation will be upheld. In all the cases
litigated to date in which the United States Supreme Court has applied strict scrutiny, the
state has met the burden of showing a compelling state interest only once, in Korematsu v.
Unite States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). There, military necessity during wartime allowed the
incarceration of Japanese-Americans during World War II.
See notes 56-60 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of the Court's refusal to
hold sex a suspect classification.
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control over their lives. Women have discovered that simultane-
ously running a house, raising a family, holding a job, and continu-
ing an education-all the while balancing precariously on a pedes-
tal-is very difficult. Men who have been expected to perform suc-
cessfully at their jobs, serve as model fathers and husbands, act as
master builders and gardeners, and generally know best, should be
particularly sensitive to this situation.
This article is intended to be suggestive, not definitive. The na-
tional effort to make a clear policy statement prohibiting discrimi-
nation on the basis of sex will be examined briefly. Florida's failure
to pass the federal equal rights amendment and some of the decep-
tive techniques used to influence votes on this issue will be assessed.
The Constitution Revision Commission's decision to allow the peo-
ple of Florida to vote directly on the issue of sexual equality rather
than through their representatives in the state legislature will then
be discussed. Finally, the article will survey current state law and
assess the impact that adoption of Revision No. 2 by the electorate
would have on life in Florida.
B. The Federal Equal Rights Amendment
The history of the federal equal rights amendment is well known.
No detailed account will be given here of the long and bitter battle
over what is now everywhere known as the ERA.3 This amendment
had been proposed in virtually every session of Congress since 19231
and was finally passed on March 22, 1972, by a Senate vote of
eighty-four to eight.5 The amendment was then submitted to the
states for ratification. To date, thirty-five states have ratified the
amendment, three short of the necessary thirty-eight. Though the
ratification effort is currently stalled, the swift action by most
states' indicates substantial support for the concept of equality rep-
resented by the amendment.
For the most part, opposition to the equal rights amendment has
been based on lies, deceptions, distortions, and half-truths spread
as gospel by well-organized and well-financed groups.7 The pattern
3. See generally B. BROWN, A. FREEDMAN, H. KATZ, & A. PRICE, WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND TME
LAW 1-12 (1977) [hereinafter cited as WOMEN'S RIGHTS]; M. DELSMAN, EVERYTHING You NEED
TO KNOW ABouT ERA 1-57 (1975); Brown, Emerson, Falk, & Freedman, The Equal Rights
Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 872-88
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Yale Article].
4. Yale Article, supra note 3, at 981-85.
5. M. DELSMAN, supra note 3, at 42-43.
6. Thirty states ratified the ERA in 1972 and 1973. Id. at 257.
7. The STOP ERA organization, headed by Phyllis Schlafly, is prototypical. The method
of distortion can be seen in similar campaigns such as the anti-gun control lobby, the anti-
19781
950 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:947
for use of the big lie against the ERA was set by Senator Sam Ervin
during his Herculean, though fortunately fruitless, efforts to pre-
vent passage of the amendment in Congress. His official depiction
of a thoughtful, well-documented, and well-reasoned 1971 Yale Law
Journal article arguing in favor of the ERA' was, to put it politely,
"a masterpiece of distortion." Ervin may not have written the at-
tack, but he placed it in the Congressional Record and was
"responsible . . .for disseminating it widely."'" Two examples suf-
fice to indicate the misrepresentation. They are typical of the misre-
presentation which has characterized the vicious campaign against
the ERA. In his minority report, Senator Ervin quoted the Yale Law
Journal article as follows: "'Male officers are provided a depen-
dents' allowance based on their grade and the number of depen-
dents . . . [The Equal Rights Amendment will recognize] the hus-
band of a female officer. . as a dependent.' "" The article actually
read:
On the other hand the rules on dependents' allowances, in-service
housing and medical benefits discriminate against women. Male
officers are provided quarters on base, or a basic quarters allow-
ance for their dependents if they live off base; male officers also
receive a dependents' allowance based on their grade and the num-
ber of dependents, regardless of any money the officer's wife may
earn. The husband of a female officer, however, is not recognized
as a dependent unless he is physically or mentally incapable of
supporting himself and is dependent on his wife for more than half
of his support.
Besides distorting the Yale Law Journal article by stringing together
bits of sentences and leaving out the intervening words, Senator
Ervin also distorted by deleting qualifying phrases. In the area of
domestic relations, his version read: "'A husband would no longer
have grounds for divorce in a wife's unjustifiable refusal to follow
him to a new home.' , After the word "home," the article con-
abortion movement, .and the ubiquitous anti-communist/big military coalition. Ms.
Schlafly's early authorship of a small volume, Strike from Space (with Chester Ward, 1965),
a vehemently militaristic handbook of Goldwater conservatives, provides an interesting coun-
terpoint to her recent anti-ERA work.
8. Cited as Yale Article, supra note 3.
9. M. DELsmAN, supra note 3, at 41.
10. Id.
11. S. REP. No. 689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1972).
12. Yale Article, supra note 3, at 978 (emphasis added).
13. S. REP. No. 689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1972).
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tinued: "unless the state also permitted the wife to sue for divorce
if her husband unjustifiably refused to accompany her in a
move."' 4 Ervin either forgot to mention these qualifying words-or
deleted them deliberately. There are at least twenty-nine other such
distortions in his minority report.1 5 Opponents of equal rights for
both sexes have persistently adopted this pattern of deception pi-
oneered by Senator Ervin. The clear implication is that these oppo-
nents will be impeded by the truth.
In Florida, the federal ERA has been considered and defeated in
every legislative session since 1973. The full house has voted three
times, passing the measure twice."0 The full senate has voted it down
twice. 7 In the 1978 session, action by a handful of committee mem-
bers prevented a vote by either house."8 Thus, less than two dozen
men have seen fit to thwart the majority will of nearly nine million
Floridians. 19 The Constitution Revision Commission has now given
the people of Florida the chance to speak for themselves.
II. THE INTENT OF THE COMMISSION
The Florida Constitution currently provides that "[a]ll natural
persons are equal before the law . . "20 To make equality explicit
for certain classes of natural persons, the basic rights section further
14. Yale Article, supra note 3, at 942.
15. For a painstaking comparison, see U.S. CrzENs' ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OF
WOMEN, DEP'T OF LABOR, THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT-SENATOR Ev.iv's MiNosrl REPORT
AND THE YALE LAW JOURNAL (1972). The author is indebted to the author of this comparison,
Dr. Virginia J. Cyrus, for the two preceding examples.
16. Action in the house has been as follows: in 1972, passed by a vote of 84-3, FLA. H.R.
Jotun. 904-05 (Reg. Sess. 1972); in 1973, failed to pass by a vote of 64-54, FLA. H.R. JOUR. 216-
17 (Reg. Sess. 1973); in 1974, died in committee, FLA. H.R. JoUR. 135 (Reg. Sess. 1974); in
1975, passed by a vote of 61-58, FLA. H.R. JouR. 109 (Reg. Sess. 1975); in 1976, died in
committee, FLA. H.R. JoUR. 115-16 (Reg. Sess. 1976); and in 1977, died on the house calendar,
FLA. H.R. JOUR. 117 (Reg. Sess. 1977).
17. Action in the senate has been as follows: in 1972, died on the senate calendar, FLA. S.
Jouln. 655 (Reg. Sess. 1972); in 1973, killed in committee, FLA. S. Joul. 70, 74 (Reg. Sess.
1973); in 1974, failed by a vote of 21-19, FLA. S. JoUR. 110 (Reg. Sess. 1974); in 1975, tabled
by a vote of 19-18, FLA. S. JoUR. 161 (Reg. Sess. 1975); in 1976, died on the senate calendar,
FLA. S. JOUR. 402 (Reg. Sess. 1976); and in 1977, failed by a vote of 21-19, FLA. S. JoUl. 143
(Reg. Sess. 1977).
18. In the 1978 session, Representative Elaine Gordon introduced three house bills and
Senator Lori Wilson introduced four senate bills. Fla. SCR 3, SJR 4, SR 5, and SB 6 (1978)
all died in the Rules Committee on June 2, 1978. Legislative Information Division, Joint
Legislative Management Committee, Bill Action Report 1 (July 27, 1978). Fla. HR 1 (1978)
died on the house calendar the same day. Id. at 2. Fla. HCR 2 and HJR 3 (1978) both died
in the Committee on Health and Rehabilitative Services. Id.
19. A poll taken by Cambridge Survey Research for The Democratic National Committee
just last year indicated that 62% of Floridians favored passage of the federal ERA. Survey
released by Florida Senator Lori Wilson, Apr. 4, 1977, on file at FSU Law Review.
20. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
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provides that "[n]o person shall be deprived of any right because
of race, religion or physical handicap." The issue of sex discrimina-
tion is not specifically addressed.2'
The Constitution Revision Commission had several options. It
could do nothing. It could add a "little ERA" as a new section. It
could delete the second sentence naming particular classes. Or it
could add sex to the existing list of specific categories.22 Recognizing
that sexual discrimination exists in Florida, the commission chose
to do something.
The debates clearly indicate the commission's intent to add a
prohibition against sex discrimination and to let the people of Flor-
ida vote it up or down. On December 8, 1977, the commission con-
sidered Proposal No. 28, which would have added a third sentence
to article I, section 2: "Equality of rights under the law shall not be
denied or abridged by the state, counties, municipalities or other
governmental units on account of sex. '23 Commissioner and Attor-
ney General Robert Shevin, a longtime supporter of the ERA, then
offered an amendment to strike this sentence and insert "sex" after
"religion" in the second sentence of section 2.24 He explained that
his purpose was to change Proposal No. 28 to "make it identical to
Proposal 27."25
Commissioner William Birchfield then offered a substitute to
Commissioner Shevin's amendment. He proposed to delete both the
existing second sentence and the proposed third sentence. 2' He
stated that the "intent of this change . . . is structural only. And
it's not intended to deprive any natural person of equality before the
law .... ",27 Birchfield said that the committee's intent would be
to continue the protections based on race, religion, and physical
handicap, and to add sex. "These rights," he insisted, "would still
21. Id. Arguably, the Florida Supreme Court has, however, adopted the "middle tier"
standard of review for sex. See discussion of In re Estate of Reed, infra at notes 64-65 and
accompanying text.
22. Proposal No. 186, introduced by Commissioners Dexter Douglass and Talbot "Sandy"
D'Alemberte, would have added a new § 23 to art. I: "Equality of rights under the law shall
not be denied or abridged on account of sex." Though temporarily passed on January 13, 1978,
this proposal failed in favor of Proposal No. 28. The same was true of Commissioner Bark-
dull's Proposal No. 225, which would have deleted the second sentence in art. I, § 2-the
sentence naming race, religion, and physical handicap.
Note that the commission "temporarily passed" those proposals which it did not want to
deal with right away but also did not want to kill. It was essentially a way of deferring
consideration of a political hot potato.
23. See Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 134 (Dec. 8, 1977) (remarks of Don Reed).
24. Id. at 134-35. This eventually became the final version.
25. Id. at 135.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 136.
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be constitutionally protected under this section.""
The subsequent debate centered on the validity and usefulness of
the commission's adoption of this declaration of intent. Commis-
sioner Jan Platt asked Commissioner Ben Overton,"5 "[Wihat
would be the legal implication of this declaration of intent?" '30 Com-
missioner Overton, then Chief Justice of the Florida Supreme
Court, responded that "the courts do look at the legislative history
to try to determine legislative intent where it's necessary to get a
proper construction. ",31 Commissioner Dexter Douglass then wanted
to know whether or not a statement of intent is binding on the court.
Commissioner Overton responded that it was not.
32
Commissioner Freddie Groomes, one of five women on the com-
mission, voiced the crucial concern, whether "some people . . . are
going to believe that instead of bettering our status, that we may
be moving back if, indeed, the last sentence in that article is
removed?" Commissioner Shevin noted that race and religion are
federally protected and "probably if we didn't have them in the
[Florida] constitution, they would still be amply protected. But I
sure would hate to have to explain to eight and a half million Florid-
ians why you took out the protection against discrimination on the
basis of race or religion."' u
The other concern was honesty with the people. As Commissioner
Don Reed put it, "[Ihf you want to be fair with the people . . . ,
you will vote head-on on the question. Do you want to insert [sex]
into this document or do you want to leave it out?"3 5 Commissioner
James Apthorp objected that "by . . . expanding this list . . . we
invite a continuous process of revision . . . .,11 Commissioner Nat
Reed gave the obvious response: "[D]o you not think that this
Commission would raise . . . the flag of fear, on the striking of the
language 'race, religion'? We have come a long way in the past but
the shadow of the memory is still present in many of our people's
lives and minds. '37 Commissioner Yvonne Burkholz added, "It is
very, very difficult to take away rights, ladies and gentlemen, and I
28. Id. at 137.
29. One of three judges on the commission.
30. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 144 (Dec. 8, 1977).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 147.
33. Id. at 150. Dr. Groomes has served as chairperson of the Governor's Commission on
the Status of Women.
34. Id. at 160.
35. Id. at 152.
36. Id. at 163.
37. Id. at 166.
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suggest that we think twice or three times or four times before we
do that. '3 8
Commissioner Birchfield's proposal to delete the second sentence
in article I, section 2, was defeated by a vote of twenty-four to ten.39
The commission then adopted Proposal No. 28, to add "sex" to the
second sentence, by a vote of twenty-four to nine.40
On January 9, 1978, the commission reconsidered Proposal No.
28. Commissioner Jack Mathews was concerned with the possible
consequences in the courts if the proposal were defeated at the
polls. 1 Commissioner Burkholz responded that she, too, had
thought seriously about this possibility. But, she said,
[tihe issue of whether or not the people vote for it or against it
should not be a consideration because if it is a consideration on this
issue, it might very well be a proper consideration of every other
issue that we determine to vote yes or no on. I think we need to
deal with this issue on the merits.'2
On the merits, the commission decided that the statement that
''all natural persons are equal before the law" was inadequate to
prevent discrimination on the basis of sex. Noting that explicit pro-
hibitions against discrimination on the basis of race, religion, or
physical handicap have been found necessary, the commissioners
reasoned that discrimination on the basis of sex should be prohib-
ited as well as a matter of state constitutional law. The motion to
reconsider Proposal No. 28 failed.43
Between March 9 and May 5, some testing of the prevailing politi-
cal climate appears to have taken place. At the commission's final
debate on May 5, Commissioner Don Reed moved to delete the
reference to sex in article I, section 2.11 The debate began again.
Commissioner Shevin once again strongly supported placing the
issue before the people, saying, "I think it would be a terrible mis-
take and a terrible slap in the face of the women of Florida to now,
at the last moment, be fearful of putting this issue on the ballot."'45
A supporter of equal rights for women, Commissioner Lois Harri-
38. Id. at 169.
39. Id. at 188.
40. Id. at 195.
41. 1 Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 5 (Jan. 9, 1978).
42. Id. at 8.
43. Id. at 31. The vote was 25-11. And it failed again on March 9, 1978, by a vote of 22-
11. 1 Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 24 (Mar. 9, 1978).
44. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 32 (May 5, 1978).
45. Id. at 34.
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son, opposed Shevin's motion to retain the sex discrimination pro-
posal." Her concern was emotionalism:
I have come to the reluctant conclusion . . . that Article I,
Section 2, does not meet [the test of presenting issues clearly and
without confusion to the voters]. The best evidence of this confu-
sion has been in the last days since our last meeting.
The State UP and AP wire services and most of the State's press
have reported headlines that we are proposing a state ERA or a
straw ballot or a referendum for the national ERA. And this is not
what we have done.4"
She pointed out that Revision No. 2 does not track the language of
the federal ERA. 8 Whether adopted or rejected, a vote on this pro-
posed revision to the Florida Constitution, she concluded, could not
properly be considered a vote on the federal ERA.49 For these rea-
sons, she urged deletion, saying, "Heated emotions can overrule
clear thinking and cloud decisions."50
Commissioner Burkholz had also reassessed the political situation
and changed her position. She agreed with Commissioner Harrison
that the proposal should be deleted:51
This issue is incapable of being treated not emotionally. It is
incapable of being treated logically, even by logical women and
men. I fear . . . that despite our protestations that this is not an
equal rights amendment, that as Commissioner Harrison has
pointed out, the press and the people will deal with it this way.5"
But Commissioner Groomes disagreed. She addressed the issue of
fear: "I am not willing to sacrifice what we perhaps can do in Florida
for fear. I am not afraid, and I hope that the other Commissioners
here will not back off on sheer fear." 3
Commissioner Shevin concluded the debate:
46. Lois Harrison is president of the League of Women Voters of Florida.
47. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 35 (May 5, 1978).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 36.
50. Id.
51. Contrary to her statement on Jan. 9, 1978. Note, however, that both Commissioners
Burkholz and Harrison are strong supporters of equal rights for women and men and that
both will be working hard to secure the adoption of Revision No. 2. Their overriding concern
in May was that opponents of equal rights would succeed in confusing adoption of an amend-
ment to the Florida Constitution with the adoption of an amendment to the United States
Constitution. Conversation with Yvonne Burkholz (July 13, 1978).
52. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 44 (May 5, 1978) (remarks of Yvonne Burkholz).
53. Id. at 38-39 (remarks of Freddie Groomes).
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[Ilt's really inconceivable to me that the people of Florida, the
same people that have already prohibited discrimination on the
basis of race, on the basis of religion, and very recently on the basis
of physically handicapped [sic], aren't going to be able to grasp
this issue.
They'll be able to grasp this issue . . . I believe very firmly
that they will also prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex. We
are not talking about sexual preference. We're talking about dis-
crimination on the basis of whether somebody is a male or a fem-
ale, a man or a woman, in job opportunities, in all opportunities
that exist.54
A roll call vote was taken, and Commissioner Shevin's proposal
to retain the prohibition against sex discrimination passed by a vote
of 21 to 15.- Proposal No. 28 will appear as Revision No. 2 on the
November ballot, to be voted up or down separately from the many
other proposed changes. The debates clearly indicate that a major-
ity of the commissioners want an end to discrimination on the basis
of sex. These commissioners also favor passage of the federal ERA.
Though both address sex discrimination, the federal amendment
and the state amendment are not identical proposals and should not
be considered as such.
Adoption of Revision No. 2 would change the Florida Constitu-
tion, not the Federal Constitution. It would affect state action in
Florida, not federal action in Washington. Those who oppose adop-
tion of the federal ERA for fear of further federal intrusion into state
affairs cannot oppose Revision No. 2 on that basis. Those who op-
pose the federal ERA and, by extension, oppose Revision No. 2 out
of fear that disastrous social consequences would swiftly and inevit-
ably follow are urged to consider carefully the following survey of the
revision's potential impact on Florida law. Those who oppose any
public policy statement of equality between the sexes for fear of a
psychological loss of status are urged to seek professional counsel-
ing.
II. THE EFFEcT ON FLORIDA LAW
This section of the note is, like Gaul, divided into three parts. The
first addresses the question of the level of judicial scrutiny which
would be afforded Revision No. 2 if adopted. The second addresses
the tiresome, scare-tactic arguments against the commission pro-
posal which will inevitably be raised by the ignorant and by those
54. Id. at 50.
55. 33 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 584 (May 5, 1978).
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who know better but choose to deceive. This part is called The False
Issues. The third part concerns The Real Issues, and focuses on the
pertinent laws and the changes which may be required if Revision
No. 2 is adopted.
A. Judicial Scrutiny
Commissioners Harrison, Groomes, and Burkholz are probably
correct in their feeling that Revision No. 2 will be perceived by the
voters as "an equal rights amendment." They may also be correct
in their assertion that Revision No. 2 is not such an amendment.
None of the commissioners followed this statement during debate
with an explanation, but some possible explanations may be sug-
gested.
First, this assertion was not contradicted during debate by those
commissioners opposed to this revision. Second, Proposal No. 186,
essentially tracking the language of the federal amendment, was not
adopted. Third, the "strict scrutiny/compelling state interest" level
of judicial review has not been applied consistently in those states
which have provisions similar to the federal ERA or provisions simi-
lar to Revision No. 2. All this supports the conclusion that the
commission proposal is indeed something which is somehow differ-
ent from the ERA.
But whether it is different, and how it might lead to different
results, is altogether unclear. In the face of a barren record, further
speculation would be fruitless. For the balance of this article, Revi-
sion No. 2 will be treated as essentially similar to an equal rights
amendment. A vote in favor of Revision No. 2 will be a vote against
discrimination on the basis of sex. One may justifiably expect that
a person casting a positive vote would assume that the same sort of
results would flow from adoption of Revision No. 2 as would flow
from adoption of the federal ERA.
The United States Supreme Court is of the opinion that upon
adoption of the federal ERA, sex would join race, alienage, and
religion as a "suspect" classification requiring strict judicial scru-
tiny and a showing of a compelling state interest before a sex-based
classification would be upheld. In 1973, in Frontiero v. Richardson,
four justices agreed that sex is a suspect classification. 5 Though
56. 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (Brennan, Douglas, White, and Marshall).
In this case, a married woman Air Force officer challenged the Air Force's dependency
regulations which, solely for administrative convenience, provided that spouses of male serv-
ice members were automatically dependent but that spouses of female service members had
to prove they were dependent for over one-half of their support. The Court found "an uncon-
stitutional discrimination against servicewomen in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment." Id. at 679.
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concurring in the judgment, Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Blackmun, did not agree that sex was sus-
pect-yet. Instead, they preferred to await adoption of the federal
ERA. 57 They are still waiting. Thus, though Jusitice Douglas is no
longer on the Court, five remaining justices are in agreement on
what would happen in the courts after adoption of the federal ERA.
In the meantime, principles of constitutional law mandate that
Florida must meet the current United States Supreme Court stan-
dard regarding sex-based classifications, a standard established in
1976 in Craig v. Boren.51 While not adopting strict scrutiny, the level
of review employed by the Court in Craig is higher than the minimal
scrutiny/rational basis test. The Court held that "classifications by
gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives." '59 This
"middle-tier" scrutiny is the minimum required of Florida courts 0
Guidance may also be found in the experiences of those states
which already prohibit sex discrimination as a matter of state con-
stitutional law. If the voters accept the commission's recommenda-
tion, Florida will join sixteen other states which have prohibitions
against sex discrimination in their constitutions." With the excep-
tions of Utah and Wyoming, all these provisions were adopted in the
1970's.62 A survey of the cases indicates that courts see these provi-
sions as requiring sexual equality. Almost always, the appropriate
57. Id. at 692.
58. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
In this case, a male between 18 and 21 challenged the constitutionality of an Oklahoma
statute allowing females to purchase 3.2% beer at age 18, but allowing males to purchase such
beer only after reaching 21. The Court found that the state's statistical evidence of drunken
driving on the part of young males was not sufficient to justify this gender-based classifica-
tion.
59. Id. at 197 (emphasis added).
60. For a thoughtful discussion of suspect classifications, see Note, Of Interests, Funda-
mental and Compelling: The Emerging Constitutional Balance, 57 B.U.L. REv. 462 (1977).
61. Of these, half specifically prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex. CoLo. CONST.
art. II, § 29 (adopted 1972); HAwAuI CONST. art. I, § 21 (adopted 1972); ILL. CONST. art. I, §
18 (adopted 1971); MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. 46 (adopted 1972); N.M. CONST.
art. I, § 18 (adopted 1973); PA. CONST. art. I, § 28 (adopted 1971); UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 1
(adopted 1896); WASH. CONsT. art. XXXI, § 1 (adopted 1972).
In the other eight, the wording is more like that of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 3 (adopted 1972);
CONN. CONST. art. I, § 20 (adopted 1974); MASS. CONST. art. I, pt. ist (adopted 1976); MONT.
CONST. art. 11, § 4 (adopted 1973); N.H. CONST. pt. 1st, art. 1H (adopted 1974); TEx. CONST.
art. I, § 3a (adopted 1972); VA. CONST. art. I, § 11 (adopted 1971); WYo. CONST. art. I, §§ 2-
3, art. 6, § 1 (adopted 1890). For a convenient compilation of these provisions, see U.S.
EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, DEP'T OF LABOR, STATE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENTS
(1976).
62. This summary of the experience so far under state prohibitions against sex discrimina-
tion is drawn generally from WOMEN'S RioHTs, supra note 3, at 19-36.
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standard of review is said to be that of strict scrutiny/compelling
state interest. This has been so regardless of the way in which the
particular state provision is worded.
During the 1970's the Florida Supreme Court has several times
addressed the issue of sex-based classifications. 3 On the whole,
such classifications have been struck. In a recent case, In re Estate
of Reed,' the Florida Supreme Court, in a 6 to 1 decision, arguably
adopted the Craig v. Boren standard. The court stated:
Under the United States Constitution a sexually discriminatory
law denies equal protection unless a fair and substantial relation-
ship to a legitimate governmental objective is demonstrated. See
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397
(1976). . . .For the same reasons the family allowance statute
violates the Florida Constitution's equal protection clause, it vio-
lates the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion.15
Thus, even without the stimulus of Revision No. 2, the Florida
Supreme Court seems to be moving in the appropriate direction.
In anticipation of the next section, it must be noted that there are
two recognized exceptions to the generally absolute prohibition
against classification on the basis of sex. 6 These are the exceptions
based on the constitutional right of privacy and on unique physical
characteristics. 7 These were enumerated in the 1971 Yale Law
Journal article and were incorporated as part of the legislative his-
63. The cases will be addressed individually in the appropriate following sections.
64. 354 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 1978). Justice England dissented. Reed involved an equal protec-
tion challenge to Florida's prior family allowance statute which provided a family allowance
during probate proceedings to a needy widow of a decedent but not to a needy widower. The
court found that the sex-based classification was "irrational" since there was "no reasonable
relation between the classification by sex and the statute's purpose." Id. at 865. The statute
has since been made sex-neutral. Act of May 31, 1974, ch. 74-106, § 1, 1974 Fla. Laws 212
(codified at FLA. STAT. § 732.403 (1977)).
65. 354 So. 2d at 865-66 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
66. There are three, if one agrees that a showing of a compelling state interest is possible.
67. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) is the leading case on privacy. Note that
the Constitution Revision Commission has proposed the addition of an explicit right to
privacy to the Florida Constitution. Proposed art. I, § 23 reads: "Every natural person has
the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life except as
otherwise provided herein. "Fla. C.R.C., Rev. Fla. Const. art. I, § 23 (May 11, 1978); see Cope,
To Be Let A lone: Florida's Proposed Right of Privacy, supra this issue; Note, Toward a Right
of Privacy as a Matter of State Constitutional Law, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 631 (1977).
A "unique physical characteristic" means "unique" to the gender. Thus, a law may make
a sex-based classification if the other sex cannot be affected by it. The usual examples are
laws relating to wet nurses and sperm donors. Yale Article, supra note 3, at 893. There are
not very many possibilities. Laws based on "average" differences-that women on the average
are weaker than men-do not come within this exception. Id.
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tory of the federal ERA."8 As such, they may be used as persuasive
authority for Florida courts interpreting a similar provision.
B. The False Issues
The false issues addressed here are those most often raised by
opponents of equal treatment for both sexes. Categorical statements
often are made about the effect of an equal rights amendment or a
similar measure in an effort to induce an emotional response from
the listener and to hide the real issues by preventing informed dis-
cussion. This tactic, though quite common, is nevertheless repre-
hensible because it corrupts the democratic process. An uninformed
citizenry cannot make rational decisions and choices. A citizenry
deliberately kept in ignorance and inflamed by lies shames the ma-
nipulators and is a detriment to us all.
The false issues most often encountered are, in alphabetical order,
bathrooms, combat, and homosexual marriages.
1. Bathrooms
The purpose of a prohibition against sex discrimination is to pro-
hibit discrimination on the basis of sex. Historically, women-
because of their sex-have been discriminated against in a
number of areas and a number of ways. Wages and salaries? Yes.
Hiring practices? Yes. Admission into professional schools? Yes.
Extension of credit? Yes. Bathrooms? No.
No one with an intelligence brighter than that of a night light can
possibly believe that adoption of Revision No. 2 will require women
and men to share the same toilet facilities, locker rooms, or sleeping
quarters. Undoubtedly, if the voters approve Revision No. 2, some
litigious crackpot with more money than brains will bring a suit
alleging a constitutional right to use the ladies' lounge. His suit will
provide employment for attorneys and amusement for the press. He
will lose, however, and the basis for the decision will be as follows.
In 1965, the United States Supreme Court, in an historic decision,
Griswold v. Connecticut, explicitly recognized a constitutional right
to privacy. 9 This decision involved the use of contraceptives by
married couples in the privacy of their own homes. In 1972, in
Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court extended the right to receive contra-
ceptive information to unmarried persons. 0 And then, in 1973, in
68. See S. REP. No. 689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1972); Yale Article, supra note 3, at 900-
02 (for privacy), and 893-96 (for unique characteristics).
69. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
70. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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Roe v. Wade7 and Doe v. Bolton,71 the Supreme Court held that the
right to privacy protected a woman in the making of an abortion
decision. The Court has thus explicitly-and repeatedly-recog-
nized a right of privacy in regard to personal bodily functions.
The authors of the carefully reasoned 1971 Yale Law Journal arti-
cle expressly recognized this right to privacy as a major qualification
to the mandates of the equal rights amendment.73 This recognition
was adopted in the majority report on the proposed federal amend-
ment. "[The right to privacy] would likewise permit a separation
of the sexes with respect to such places as public toilets, as well as
sleeping quarters of public institutions."74 This federal constitu-
tional right is applicable to all citizens.
Even if the right to privacy were not recognized as an exception
to or qualification of prohibitions against sex discrimination, the
outcome would be the same. Absent an exception, a bathroom chal-
lenge would present a conflict between two constitutional rights: the
right to privacy and the right to be free from discrimination on the
basis of sex. In such a situation, the Court would apply the time-
honored judicial maneuver known as "balancing the interests in-
volved."7 5 Given that those concerned with prohibiting sex discrimi-
nation have historically been unconcerned with bathrooms, and
that the social mores in America today strongly favor privacy in the
performance of personal bodily functions, the Court would undoubt-
edly decide that privacy prevails.
So much for bathrooms.
2. Combat
The issue of women in combat presents somewhat different con-
siderations. The most important point to note at the outset, how-
ever, is that adoption of Revision No. 2 would have absolutely no
effect whatsoever on whether, if, or when women become part of a
combat unit. The reason for this is simple. The State of Florida has
no army.
The United States Congress decides whether to allow American
women to fight. Congress makes the rules for the national armed
forces, and Congress decided in 1948 to allow the Secretary of the
71. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
72. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
73. Yale Article, supra note 3, at 900-02. The other qualification was on the basis of unique
physical characteristics.
74. S. REP. No. 689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1972).
75. This is known in non-legal circles as the use of common sense.
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Army to assign women certain kinds of military duty and he has
prohibited women from joining combat units.7" In all other respects,
women and men are to be treated the same. The rules for the Army,
Navy, Air Force, and Marines are equally applicable to the Florida
National Guard, which is, for combat purposes, a national and not
a Florida military force.
Ratification of the federal equal rights amendment would proba-
bly eventually require Congress to allow women to join combat units
if they desire and if they met the requisite physical qualifications.
The federal ERA would not require women to fight. Aptitude for
combat involves particular physical and psychological qualities.
Some women are suited, some are not. Some men are suited, some
are not. Wounds are just as painful for men as they are for women,
and death is just as final. Prohibiting a woman from making this
choice solely on the basis of sex would be impermissible under the
federal equal rights amendment." But sex would not be the only
consideration in making the choice.
However, political realities would dictate when Congress would
get around to lifting the prohibition against women in combat. Cer-
tainly no congressman hoping for another term would vote for such
a measure in the face of massive public sentiment to the contrary,
regardless of a constitutional amendment. Moreover, once the pro-
hibition was lifted, no woman would be forced to join a combat
unit.78 And that is the whole point of prohibitions against discrimi-
nation on the basis of sex: to remove artificial, irrational, and un-
founded barriers to the exercise of free choice to run one's own life.
The only purely Florida force to which this provision might be
applicable is the "militia" referred to in article X, section 2 of the
Florida Constitution. This section, however, is already sex-neutral.
It reads: "The milita shall be composed of all ablebodied
inhabitants of the state who are or have declared their intention to
76. Women's Armed Services Integration Act of 1948, ch. 449, § 104(g), 62 Stat. 359 (1948)
(current version at 10 U.S.C. § 3580 (1970)). Army regulations today still proscribe women
from filling those Military Occupational Specialties "associated with combat, close combat
support, unusual hazards or strenuous physical demands." Blumenson, The Army's Women
Move Out: A Status Report, ARMY, Feb. 1978, at 18. Of the over 300 different duty assign-
ments in the Army, only 16 are currently closed to women. Id. See generally U.S. GOV'T
PRINTING OFFICE, ARMY OCCUPATIONAL HANDBOOK (1976).
The Navy and Marines are governed by 10 U.S.C. § 6015 (1970) ("women may not be
assigned to duty in aircraft that are engaged in combat missions nor may they be assigned
to duty on vessels of the Navy other than hospital ships and transports"). The Air Force
prohibition is found at id. § 8549 ("Female members of the Air Force... may not be assigned
to duty in aircraft engaged in combat missions.").
77. Yale Article, supra note 3, at 976-77.
78. Note that the draft has been abolished, replaced by all-volunteer forces.
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become citizens of the United States . .,,7' The word
"inhabitants" does not distinguish between males and females.
This should cause no alarm among the stay-at homes, however. The
possibility that the people of Florida will be called on to defend the
state in the absence of any national forces is very remote.
3. Homosexual Marriages
The assertion that passage of a prohibition against sex discrimi-
nation would lead to homosexual marriages is equally false. An
equal rights provision requires that both sexes be treated equally.
There would be a violation if, for example, males were allowed to
marry each other but females were not. There is no violation, how-
ever, if members of both sexes are prohibited from marrying mem-
bers of their own sex. This is equal treatment.
There are no reported decisions in Florida to which a Florida court
might turn for guidance. There are, however, three major reported
decisions from other states addressing this issue.80 In the earliest,
Baker v. Nelson in 1971, the Minnesota Supreme Court found that
a prohibition against marriages between persons of the same sex
does not offend the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.8" The court had to resort to Webster's Dictionary, the book
of Genesis, and some statutory construction to define marriage "as
a union of man and woman,"8 because the Minnesota statute at
issue did not specify male and female.
This case was followed in 1973 by Jones v. Hallahan.3 There
again, the Kentucky statute did not specifically prohibit same-sex
marriages. Again using Webster's, as well as other dictionaries, the
court defined marriage "according to common usage"" and decided
that while the statutes did not prevent appellants from marrying,
the appellants were "incapab[le] of entering into a marriage as
that term is defined. A license to enter into a status or a relationship
which the parties are incapable of achieving is a nullity. '85
79. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 2(a) (emphasis added). Note that other than renumbering this
section because of the proposed deletion of the current § 1, the Constitution Revision Com-
mission has made no changes in this section.
80. A fourth case often mentioned is Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (Sup.
Ct. 1971). The court reached the same conclusion as in the three cases discussed in the text
below, but this case also involved the somewhat more complicated issue of the appropriate
sex to assign to a person who has undergone a sex-change operation. See generally Holloway,
Transsexuals-Their Legal Sex, 40 U. COLO. L. REv. 282 (1968).
81. 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
82. Id. at 186.
83. 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973).
84. Id. at 589.
85. Id.
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The most significant case for our purposes is Singer v. Hara8 from
the State of Washington, in which the court addressed the issue of
same-sex marriages by applying that state's equal rights amend-
ment. 7 In Washington, as in Minnesota and Kentucky, the particu-
lar statute mentioned "persons" and not males and females.88 Even
so, the court construed the statute to apply only to males and fe-
males.89 The court then found that the- King County Auditor had
properly refused to issue a marriage license to the two male appel-
lants. The marriage license was not refused because of an impermis-
sible sexual classification but rather because marriage is a relation-
ship "which may be entered into only by two persons who are mem-
bers of the opposite sex."' The court then inquired into the intent
of the citizens who ratified the state's ERA:
The primary purpose of the ERA is to overcome discriminatory
legal treatment as between men and women "on account of sex."
.. .The ERA does not create any new rights or responsibilities
.; rather, it merely insures that existing rights and responsi-
bilities . . which previously might have been wholly or partially
denied to one sex or to the other, will be equally available to
members of either sex.9
And finally, and most importantly, "we hold the ERA does not
require the state to authorize same-sex marriage."9"
Decisions from other states are not, of course, binding on Florida
courts. But the consistency of these opinions and the fact that one
decision was based squarely on a state equal rights amendment
make these cases persuasive authority. In addition, there is author-
ity from within Florida which leads to the same conclusion.
Any decision on this subject will be easier in Florida than in the
other three states because section 741.04(1), Florida Statutes, spe-
cifically requires that in a marriage, "one party is a male and the
other party is a female. '9 3 Attorney General Shevin addressed this
question in a 1976 opinion.94 He reviewed the cases already men-
86. 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
87. WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § 1: "Equality of rights and responsibility under the law
shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex." Note that neither Minnesota nor Kentucky
has an equal rights amendment or a prohibition of sex discrimination.
88. 522 P.2d at 1189.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1192.
91. Id. at 1194.
92. Id. at 1195.
93. (1977).
94. [1976] FLA. ATr'y GEN. ANN. REP. 53.
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tioned and held that marriage licenses are not required to be issued
to persons of the same sex. 5 It should not be forgotten either that a
Florida court will look at the intent of the Constitution Revision
Commission in proposing a prohibition against sex discrimination.
Shevin, in his capacity as a member of the commission, proposed
changing the word "sex" to "gender" to "eliminate any question on
sexual preference."" Though his amendment failed, the commis-
sioners were in agreement with the motive behind it."
Passage of Revision No. 2 would not lead to homosexual marri-
ages in Florida. Those who raise this false issue either do not know
the law or have deliberately chosen to ignore it. "Intellectually dis-
honest" is the kindest adjective to apply to such people.
C. The Real Issues
Having dealt with the scare tactics, it is time to consider the
serious question of what effects the adoption of Revision No. 2 would
have on Florida law.99 The following survey addresses sex-sensitive
areas of substantive law: domestic relations, labor laws, criminal
laws, exemptions, specific statutory references to women, civil
rights, and disparate impact. Space and time constraints do not
permit an exhaustive study of these areas or consideration of other
areas not mentioned at all. However, the discussion which follows
will give a fairly accurate picture of the existing state of the law,
potential problems already met, and the areas where changes will
be required.
1. Domestic Relations
Within the broad area of domestic relations, five specific topics
must be discussed: age, names, consortium, spousal support on di-
vorce, and child custody and support on divorce.
Age. Laws governing the ages at which men and women are con-
sidered adults and at which men and women may marry have tradi-
tionally been sex-based. They were based on outdated premises:
95. Id.
96. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 190 (Dec. 8, 1977) (remarks of Robert Shevin).
97. Id. at 189-93 (especially remarks of Lois Harrison and Edward Annis).
98. For the following analysis, the author is indebted to FLORIDA SENATE JUDICIARY COM-
MITrEE, FLORIDA STATUTES PoTENTLALLY Amcm BY THE EQUAL RIGHTs AMENDMENT (1973) (on
file at Florida Legislative Library, The Capitol, Tallahassee, Florida); to an update prepared
in 1975 by the Organization of Women Law Students at the Florida State University College
of Law, in cooperation with the Big Bend Coalition to Support the Equal Rights Amendment,
Florida Statutes Potentially Affected by the Equal Rights Amendment (1975) (on file with
the FSU Law Review); and to WOMEN'S RIGHTS, supra note 3.
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that women will marry earlier than men and not work outside the
home and that men especially need education beyond high school
to carry the primary responsibility for support of a family.
Section 743.07 of the Florida Statutes sets the age of majority for
"all persons" at "18 years of age or older." 9 Florida law is thus in
conformity with the proposed revision. 00
Florida law is also in conformity with Revision No. 2 on the ages
at which men and women may marry. Until recently section 741.06
of the Florida Statutes provided for discretionary issuance of a li-
cense "to any male or female under the age of 18 years" on sworn
application that they are parents or expectant parents.10' The stat-
ute further prohibited the issuance of a license to marry "to any
male under the age of 18 years, [or] to any female under the age
of 16 years, with or without the consent of their parents except as
hereinabove provided."'' 2 By implication, a woman, but not a man,
between the ages of sixteen and eighteen could marry with parental
consent. This section was repealed effective October 1, 1977.103 The
applicable provisions are now set in section 741.04(1), which elimi-
nates the age differential between men and women and also elimi-
nates the judge's (or clerk's) discretion. Now a license "shall issue"
upon proof that the parties are over eighteen. If either of the parties
is under eighteen, the license "shall not issue" without the parents'
written consent.1'0 Passage of Revision No. 2 would therefore not
require any implementing legislation in this respect.
Names. Though women almost always adopt their husbands' sur-
names in marriage, this practice is a matter of custom, not law. At
common law, a person may adopt any name by consistent usage if
adopted in good faith and without intent to deceive or defraud. 10 5
Court proceedings are not required. In 1976, in Davis v. Roos, the
First District Court of Appeal affirmed this interpretation of the
common law, contrary to some misinterpretations in other jurisdic-
99. (1977).
100. And in fact all states have set the age of majority uniformly at 18, following the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (finding




103. Act of May 10, 1977, ch. 77-19, § 2, 1977 Fla. Laws 28.
104. FLA. STAT. (1977).
105. MacDougall, Married Women's Common Law Right to Their Own Surnames,
WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP., Fall/Winter 1973, at 4; see Stuart v. Board of Supervisors of Elec-
tions, 295 A.2d 223, 227 (Md. 1972) (extensive discussion of the common law of names); State
ex rel. Krupa v. Green, 177 N.E.2d 616 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961) (a leading early decision); THE
CENTER FOR A WOMAN'S OWN NAME, BOOKLET FOR WOMEN WHO WISH TO DETERMINE THEm OWN
NAMES AFTER MARRIAGE (1974).
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tions.'"1 The court held that the plaintiff in Davis was therefore
entitled to have a driver's license issued in her maiden name.
Two years earlier, in Marshall v. State, the same court had up-
held a married woman's right to establish her birth name through
legal process "even though she continued her marriage with her
husband."'' 7 The circuit judge in Leon County had denied her peti-
tion as " 'misleading and . . . contrary to public policy.' ,,10 In re-
versing, the court of appeal noted that the Florida Statutes did not
contain any prohibition against a married woman changing her
name. 10
Section 68.07 of the Florida Statutes provides for a change of
name in a court proceeding."" This provision is sex-neutral and does
not require spousal consent. Further, the statute does not require a
spouse's name to change automatically if the other spouse changes
his or her name. Rather, the spouse and any minor children "may"
join in the other spouse's petition."' Where one parent petitions for
a name change for a minor child, the other parent must be notified.
But consent is not required."2
Section 68.07(7) provides, however, that these name change pro-
cedures do not apply to dissolution of marriage or to adoption. On
divorce, the wife may have a change of name entered as part of the
final judgment. The procedure appears to be automatic."' By judi-
cial rule, a child's name will be changed to his or her mother's birth
name during a dissolution of marriage proceeding only if the court
finds it to be in the child's best interest."'
Consortium. At common law, the husband could sue for loss of his
wife's companionship, affection, and sexual services. The wife had
no such corresponding right for loss of her husband's services. This
resulted from the legal fiction that upon marriage the two became
one-and that one was the husband."'
106. 326 So. 2d 226, 228 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
107. 301 So. 2d 477, 477 (Fla. lst Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 478, referring to FLA. STAT. § 62.031, which has been transferred to § 68.07
(1977).
110. (1977).
111. Id. § 68.07(5).
112. Id. § 68.07(6).
113. See THE FLORIDA BAR, CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, FLORIDA DISSOLUTION OF
MARRIAGE § 4.105, at 119 (1976).
114. Lazow v. Lazow, 147 So. 2d 12, 14 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1962) ("To change the name
of a minor son so that be no longer bears his father's name is a serious matter, and such action
may be taken only where the record affirmatively shows that such change is required for the
welfare of the minor.").
115. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs §§ 124-125, at 873-74, 889-94 (4th ed.
1971).
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Since the decision in 1950 in Hitaffer v. Argonne Co.,"' however,
most states have recognized a cause of action for married women on
loss of consortium. Florida has been among this majority since the
Florida Supreme Court's 1971 decision in Gates v. Foley."7 The
court noted in that case that the "unity concept of marriage has in
a large part given way to the partner concept whereby a married
woman stands as an equal to her husband in the eyes of the law.""'
In receding from the earlier leading case of Ripley v. Ewell,"9 the
court found that this sex-based classification "discriminates unrea-
sonably and arbitrarily against women and must be abolished.' ' 20
Spousal Support on Divorce. In 1971, Florida adopted what is
generally referred to as "no-fault" divorce. 12' The traditional
grounds for divorce were abolished and replaced by the requirement'
that (1) the marriage be irretrievably broken or (2) one of the parties
be mentally incompetent.'
At the same time, all references in the statutes to "husband" and
"wife" were replaced with "spouse" or "party." Section 61.08 of the
Florida Statutes now provides that "the court may grant alimony
to either party, which alimony may be rehabilitative or permanent
in nature. 12 3 The legislature thus recognized that there are times
when neither spouse will need alimony and that occasionally the
husband might be in more need than the wife.
Section 61.08 further provides that "the court may consider any
factor necessary to do equity and justice between the parties.' 24
This discretion is overbroad because it permits a judge to act on the
stereotypes of the past.
The 1978 legislature adopted guidelines to preserve the sex-
neutral intent of chapter 61, amending section 61.08 to provide fac-
116. 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950).
117. 247 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1971).
118. Id. at 44.
119. 61 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1952).
120. 247 So. 2d at 45.
121. Act of June 22, 1971, ch. 71-241, 1971 Fla. Laws 1319 (current version at FLA. STAT.
§§ 61.001-.20 (1977)).
122. FLA. STAT. § 61.052 (1977). Compare ch. 67-254, § 16, 1967 Fla. Laws 560, 607, setting
out the traditional grounds.
123. (1977). The distinctions between and reasons for rehabilitative and permanent ali-
mony may be explored in the following cases: rehabilitative alimony-Sisson v. Sisson, 311
So. 2d 799 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975), quashed, 336 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1976); Reback v.
Reback, 296 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 312 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1975);
Mertz v. Mertz, 287 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1973); permanent alimony-Caracristi
v. Caracristi, 324 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Brown v. Brown, 300 So. 2d 719
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974), cert. dismissed, 307 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 1975); Schultz v. Schultz,
290 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
124. FLA: STAT. § 61.08(2) (1977) (emphasis added).
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tors which the court should consider in determining a proper award
of alimony.' 5 These factors include (but are not limited to):
(a) The standard of living established during the marriage.
(b) The duration of the marriage.
(c) The age and the physical and emotional condition of both
parties.
(d) The financial resources of each party.
(e) Where applicable, the time necessary for either party to ac-
quire sufficient education or training to enable him or her to find
appropriate employment.
(f) The contribution of each party to the marriage, including but
not limited to services rendered in homemaking, child care, educa-
tion and career building of the other party.' 6
Though other factors might have been included, the legislature
has taken a major step toward furthering the goal of a divorce proce-
dure equitable to both parties. This clear statement of public policy
is most welcome. It would not be endangered in any way by approval
of Revision No. 2 at the polls. In fact, such approval might well be
viewed as an endorsement of the legislative desire to treat the sexes
equally in matters of spousal support following divorce.
Child Custody and Support on Divorce. By statute, Florida has
adopted the "best interests of the child" criterion for determining
custody.'17 By judicial gloss, however, Florida has preserved the
"tender years doctrine" favoring awarding young children to the
mother.'28 Adoption of Revision No. 2 would not permit such a pre-
sumption. The factors listed in section 61.13(3)129 are useful guide-
lines for determining custody and should be retained. These factors
include:
(a) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between
the parents and the child.
(b) The capacity and disposition of the parents to give the child
love, affection, and guidance and to continue the educating of the
child.
125. Act of June 19, 1978, ch. 78-339, 1978 Fla. Laws -.
126. Id. § 1.
127. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b) (1977).
128. Silvestri v. Silvestri, 309 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (citing Anderson v.
Anderson, 309 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1975) ("other essential factors being equal, the mother of
infants of tender years should receive prime consideration for custody") (dictum)). This
dictum was stated despite the requirement in FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2) (1977), that "equal
consideration" be given the father. Note, however, that this dictum has not been adopted by
the other district courts of appeal-or by the Florida Supreme Court.
129. FLA. STAT. (1977).
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(c) The capacity and disposition of the parents to provide the
child with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care
recognized and permitted under the laws of this state in lieu of
medical care, and other material needs.
(d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory
environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity.
(e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed
custodial home.
(f) The moral fitness of the parents.
(g) The mental and physical health of the parents.
(h) The home, school, and community record of the child.
(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems
the child to be of sufficient intelligence, understanding, and ex-
perience to express a preference.
(j) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a
particular child custody dispute.3 "
Summary. In the area of domestic relations, then, some changes
must be made. The absolute right of a woman to change her name
in conjunction with a dissolution of marriage proceeding or to retain
her birth name at marriage should be made explicit. Further, the
legislature should continue to consider the factors to be used in
determining alimony, child custody, and child support on divorce.
Explicit guidelines are necessary to protect both men and women
from the perpetuation of sex-based stereotypes through judicial
prejudices. Adoption of Revision No. 2 would provide needed impe-
tus for such legislative reform.
2. Labor
Discrimination in this area has most often been found in un-
employment compensation, workmen's compensation, and "pro-
tective" labor laws.
Unemployment Compensation. Discrimination in unemployment
compensation generally finds expression in special rules about cov-
erage for pregnancy and maternity leave, in the definitions of
"voluntary leaving," and in coverage for domestic workers. 1'
Many states have special rules automatically disqualifying
women from employment for certain periods before and after child-
birth and requiring proof of ability to return to work not required
of other employees who are temporarily disabled. In 1975, such an
130. Id.
131. In other states, discrimination exists in the rules regarding coverage for dependents.
Florida, however, has no such coverage.
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automatic denial of benefits was held an unconstitutional denial of
due process by the United States Supreme Court in Turner v. De-
partment of Employment Security.'32
Florida has no such special rules. Further, Florida's provision that
pregnancy was not "good cause" for leaving employment so that
unemployment Compensation might be denied was repealed in
1977.113 Since many women with children now work outside the
home, regulations based on outdated stereotypes should not act to
penalize such employment. Clearly, some women may be physically
unable to work after childbirth and so would be unavailable for
work. Unemployment compensation benefits would not be available
for these women.
Florida is one of many states in which unemployment benefits are
not available in the absence of "good cause" for unemployment.
Except in cases of illness or disability, "good cause" must be
"attributable to the employer.' 1 34 Generally, good causes attributa-
ble to the employer have to do with economic lay-offs and the like.
"Voluntary leaving" is not considered "good cause." Leaves necessi-
tated by changes in family circumstances, such as marriage, moving
to a new home, or caring for a sick relative are more likely to be
taken by women than men. As a consequence, the "attributable to
the employer" definition has a disparate impact on women. Since
many more women are entering the labor market with the expecta-
tion and intention of remaining, Florida should reconsider those
policies which make it difficult for women to establish a clear at-
tachment to the labor force.
Nationally, about ninety-eight percent of those employed as do-
mestic workers in private households are women. 35 Continued ex-
clusion of this group from unemployment coverage has clearly had
a severe impact on the ability of women to care for their families
when laid off through no fault of their own. Florida now provides
unemployment compensation for some domestic workers. Section
443.03(5) of the Florida Statutes was amended in 1977 to provide
132. 423 U.S. 44 (1975).
133. Act of June 16, 1977, ch. 77-262, § 4, 1977 Fla. Laws 1220 (current version at FLA.
STAT. § 443.06(1) (1977)). The statute previously provided "that good cause ... shall include
only such cause as is attributable to the employer or consists of illness or disability of the
individual, other than pregnancy, requiring separation from his employment." The italicized
phrase was deleted.
For a discussion of the new provisions in Florida's unemployment law, see Note, Reluctant
Reform: Recent Changes in Unemployment Compensation in Florida, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REv.
507 (1978).
134. FLA. STAT. § 443.06(1) (1977).
135. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK
177 (1974-75).
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coverage for "domestic service after December 31, 1977, in a private
home, local college club, or local chapter of a college fraternity or
sorority performed for a person who paid cash remuneration of
$1,000 or more after December 31, 1977, in any calendar quarter
• . . to individuals employed in such domestic service.' This cov-
erage is commendable, but the $1,000 per quarter requirement still
leaves most domestic workers without protection.
Workmen's Compensation. The primary concerns in this area re-
late to dependency benefits and coverage for domestic workers.
Florida also has an enlightened policy on dependency benefits
under the Workmen's Compensation Law. The discriminatory as-
sumption in provisions regarding dependents, of course, is that the
employee is male and the dependents are the female spouse and
children. In 1974, section 440.16 was amended to provide benefits
to the surviving "spouse" rather than to the "widow.' 37 Clearly any
provision awarding benefits to one sex and not the other would be
discriminatory.
Florida has also sex-neutralized the burden of proof regarding
dependency. Before 1974, a widower had to show he had been living
with his wife at the time of her death, had been dependent on her
for support, and had not been able to support himself in order to
qualify for workmen's compensation benefits. 38 In contrast, a widow
merely had to be living with her husband at the time of his death. 139
In 1974, these provisions were amended. 14 0 Now a "spouse" must
show substantial dependence on the decedent in order to be eligible.
"Substantial dependence" is not defined in the statute.'4 ' Revision
No. 2 would mandate the same standards for both women and men.
Unlike the unemployment compensation provisions, however,
domestic workers are not covered by workmen's compensation. "2 A
domestic worker injured while working in Florida has no statutory
protection at all in the form of compensation for the injury. This
section should be amended to make it comparable to the unemploy-
ment compensation rules.
136. Act of June 16, 1977, ch. 77-262, § 1, 1977 Fla. Laws 1220 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
443.03(5)(o) (1977)).
137. Act of June 17, 1974, ch. 74-197, § 11, 1974 Fla. Laws 542 (current version at FIA.
STAT. § 440.16 (1977)).
138. Act of May 25, 1935, ch. 17481, § 2(15) 1935 Fla. Laws 1456 (current version at FIA.
STAT. § 440.02(15) (1977)).
139. Id. § 2(14) (current version at FtA. STAT. § 440.02(15) (1977)).
140. Act of June 17, 1974, ch. 74-197, § 1, 1974 Fla. Laws 542 (current version at FLA. STAT.
§ 440.02(15) (1977)).
141. Determinations are made on a case-by-case basis by the judges of industrial claims
and on review at the Industrial Relations Commission.
142. FLA. STAT. § 440.02(1)(C)1 (1977).
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"Protective" Labor Laws. In a 1973 survey of the Florida Stat-
utes, the Senate Judiciary Committee found four protective labor
laws. Three of these have been repealed." 3 The fourth, section
449.10(1), prohibits private employment agencies from sending
"any female help" to "any questionable place, or place of bad re-
pute, house of ill-fame or assignation house . . . ."" This chapter
was repealed effective July 1, 1980, by sunset law. The alternative,
of course, would have been to make the section sex-neutral.
Summary. Florida should reconsider state policy about "good
cause" for leaving employment and should amend chapter 440 to
provide workmen's compensation coverage for domestic workers.
Otherwise, Florida's labor laws are in substantial conformity with
the requirements of Revision No. 2.
3. Criminal Laws
Rape. While the traditional legal definition of rape was female-
sex-based,' many states now protect male victims of sexual aggres-
sion in their forcible rape statutes.'47 Florida is one of these states.
Chapter 794 of the Florida Statutes was amended in 1972 to protect
men as well as women."' In 1974, chapter 794 was renamed "Sexual
Battery," and the determination evidenced two years earlier to pro-
tect both men and women from sexual aggression was carried for-
ward.'"9 In addition to providing explicit definitions of the acts, the
actors, and the victims, the act repealed section 794.06, which had
made carnal intercourse by a male with an unmarried female idiot
punishable as a second-degree felony. ° While the provision could
have been made sex-neutral, the intent was transferred to the defi-
nitions section in the definition of "mentally defective.' 5'
Section 794.05 provides particularly for the punishment of anyone
having "unlawful carnal intercourse with any unmarried person, of
previous chaste character, . . . under the age of 18 years."' 52 This
143. Act of June 25, 1975, ch. 75-195, § 4, 1975 Fla. Laws 385 (repealing FLA. STAT. §§
450.031, .041, .091).
144. FLA. STAT. (1977).
145. Act of June 17, 1976, ch. 76-168, § 3, 1976 Fla. Laws 295, 297.
146. S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL 16-30 (1975); Note, Rape and Rape Laws: Sex-
ism in Society and Law, 61 CALIF. L. Rav. 919 (1973).
147. WOMEN'S RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 46.
148. Act of Dec. 8, 1972, ch. 72-724, § 7, 1973 Fla. Laws 15 (current version at FLA. STAT.
§ 794.011 (1977)).
149. Act of May 31, 1974, ch. 74-121, § 2, 1974 Fla. Laws 371 (current version at FLA. STAT.
§ 794.011 (1977)).
150. Act of June 7, 1909, ch. 5909, 1909 Fla. Laws 54.
151. FLA. STAT. § 794.011(1)(b) (1977).
152. FLA. STAT. (1977).
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section has been sex-neutral since 1921.1
53
In its statutory requirements, therefore, Florida meets the expec-
tations of Revision No. 2. Enforcement in many states has been
discriminatory, however. Police officers often focus their interroga-
tions on the victim rather than the assailant. This skeptical and, in
fact, sexist attitude on the part of enforcement personnel has often
been carried over into the evidentiary standards used at trial. This
has led to the humiliation of rape victims, and it has done little to
inspire the conviction of rapists.
Fortunately, Florida is one of many states which have limited the
use at trial of evidence concerning the victim's prior sexual conduct
or reputation for chastity.54 Section 794.022(1) provides that the
"testimony of the victim need not be corroborated" in sexual bat-
tery cases.55 Furthermore, evidence of the victim's prior sexual ac-
tivity may not be admitted unless consent is at issue. Even then,
the judge must find a "pattern of conduct. . . relevant to the issue
of consent" out of the jury's presence before the evidence will be
submitted to the jury.156
Prostitution. Florida amended the statutory definitions of prosti-
tution in 1943 so that both male and female prostitutes are cov-
ered. 57 In addition, both prostitutes and patrons now are subject to
the same penalties. 5 ' The 1978 legislature amended the remaining
section of the Florida Statutes which should be sex-neutral. Section
796.03 currently provides for punishment of anyone procuring a fe-
male under the age of sixteen for prostitution."' Chapter 78-45 of
the Laws of Florida correctly extends this protection to males under
the age of sixteen, effective October 1, 1978.'10 References to
"female" have been replaced by "person."''
153. Act of June 14, 1921, ch. 8596, § 1, 1921 Fla. Laws 421 (current version at FLA. STAT.
§ 794.05 (1977)).
154. See Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Reform, 81 YALE L.J.
1365 (1972), arguing as the title suggests.
155. FLA. STAT. (1977). The new Florida Evidence Code does not change this section. See
id. § 90.404(2).
156. Id. § 794.022(2). This change in the rules relating to evidence in rape cases was added
by Act of May 31, 1974, ch. 74-121, § 2, 1974 Fla. Laws 371.
157. Act of May 1, 1943, ch. 21664, § 3, 1943 Fla. Laws 47 (current version at FLA. STAT.
§ 796.07 (1977)).
Arguably, however, only females were included if § 796.07 were read with ch. 795, Enticing
Away Unmarried Women, and § 796.03, Procuring female under age of 16 for prostitution.
Chapter 795 was repealed in 1972. Act of Apr. 18, 1972, ch. 72-254, § 4, 1972 Fla. Laws 888.
158. FLA. STAT. § 796.07(5) (1977).
159. FLA. STAT. (1977).
160. Act of May 17, 1978, §§ 1-2, 1978 Fla. Laws 48. By this amendment Florida has
unequivocally made the statutory definitions of prostitution sex-neutral.
161. Id. § 1.
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Here again, Florida already meets the requirements of Revision
No. 2. The adoption of this proposal would, however, serve a useful
and necessary purpose. Adoption would provide an explicit state-
ment that enforcement of the prostitution laws is not to be done
selectively. Patrons as well as prostitutes should be prosecuted.
Equal enforcement might well result in a movement to decriminal-
ize prostitution.
Defamation. One criminal statute should be changed. Section
836.04 provides a first-degree misdemeanor punishment for anyone
defaming a married or unmarried woman by "falsely and mali-
ciously imputing to her a want of chastity. . . .'"" This section has
been in the statutes since 1883.113 The provision either should be
made sex-neutral or should be repealed. As it is, it amounts to little
more than a curious anachronism.
Summary. While Florida's statutory provisions for both rape and
prostitution are now sex-neutral, problems of enforcement remain.
The legislature should address this situation forthrightly-perhaps
in the form of public hearings, or by the establishment of a presti-
gious commission. An unequivocal policy statement should then be
adopted reflecting the legislature's findings and the requirements of
Revision No. 2.
4. Exemptions
Several Florida laws grant exemptions based on sex. These
should, at the least, be made sex-neutral. The legislature should
also consider whether certain economic guidelines might be appro-
priate.
Article VII, § 3(b). Article VII, § 3(b) of the Florida Constitution
allows a $500 property tax exemption to widows. In 1974, this provi-
sion was the subject of an equal protection challenge by a widower
in Kahn v. Shevin. 6 Using the rational basis test, the United States
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the provision be-
cause of the traditional disparity in earnings between men and
women. The Court found that the provision properly cushions "the
financial impact of spousal loss upon the sex for which that loss
imposes a disproportionately heavy burden."'' 5
In dissent, Justice Brennan called for the use of "close judicial
scrutiny, because [the classification] focuses upon generally im-
162. FLA. STAT. (1977).
163. Act of Jan. 30, 1883, ch. 3460, 1883 Fla. Laws 73.
164. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
165. Id. at 355.
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mutable characteristics over which individuals have little or no con-
trol, and also because gender-based classifications too often have
been inexcusably utilized to stereotype and stigmatize politically
powerless segments of society."'"6 Justice Brennan would narrow the
exemption to needy widows.' 7 Justice White, however, suggested
changing the category to include both needy widows and widow-
ers.'
6 8
The better choice is that of Justice White. Ameliorating the ef-
fects of past discrimination is a worthy and appealing goal but not
consonant with equal protection. The Constitution Revision Com-
mission has chosen to follow Justice White. The revised constitu-
tion as proposed by the commission on May 11, 1978, would amend
article VII, § 3(b) to include widowers.' 9
Others. Similarly, three sections in the Florida Statutes should be
made sex-neutral. They are: section 196.081, providing a homestead
exemption for the widow of a permanently disabled veteran; section
205.162, exempting widows with minor dependents from payment of
local occupational license taxes; and section 352.22(1)(c), allowing
free or reduced transportation on common carriers to widows of
deceased employees and their dependents.' 0 Again, the purposes
behind these sections are laudatory but impermissibly discrimina-
tory.
5. Statutes in Which Women Are Specifically Treated
Several statutes were enacted specifically to grant women the
right to do or to be particular things. These sections have served a
useful purpose over the years. Some have already been repealed.
Some probably should be repealed. Others probably should be re-
tained for a while to discourage attempted reinstatements of the
discriminatory laws these sections replaced.
Repealed. Section 29.09, providing that women were eligible to be
court reporters, was repealed in 1977 as obsolete.' Section 608.56,
providing that women are competent to be incorporators, subscri-
bers, members, stockholders, directors, or officers of corporations,
was repealed with the entire chapter in 1975.172 Chapter 607, replac-
ing chapter 608, does not reinstate this provision.
166. Id. at 357.
167. Id. at 360.
168. Id. at 361-62 (White, J., dissenting).
169. See Fla. C.R.C., Rev. Fla. Const. art. VII, § 3(b) (May 11, 1978).
170. FLA. STAT. (1977).
171. Act of June 6, 1977, ch. 77-104, § 15, 1977 Fla. Laws 245.
172. Act of June 29, 1975, ch. 75-250, § 139, 1975 Fla. Laws 711.
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Chapter 654, Savings Banks, has been repealed effective July 1,
1980.1 3 With it went section 654.03, allowing "[elvery person . . .
notwithstanding [that] such person [is] a married woman" to
make withdrawals from savings banks, a provision enacted in
1889.1 4 At the same time, as part of a general repeal of chapter 660,
Banking Code, Third Part, section 660.01(5), allowing trust compa-
nies or banks to accept trusts from married women, was elimi-
nated.' The preceding two sections need not be reinstated.
Ought To Be Repealed. Section 117.02, making women eligible to
become notaries public, was enacted in 1899.111 By now, such eligi-
bility should be clear. The statute should be repealed.
Probably Should Be Retained Temporarily. Certain other sec-
tions should probably be retained for the time being. Section 694.04
was enacted in 1905 to cure defects in certain conveyances by mar-
ried women. " ' Similarly, section 689.03 was enacted in 1891 to pre-
scribe the form for warranty deeds and to provide specifically that
married women may convey whatever interest they possess. "8 In a
state acknowledging tenancy by the entirety, such a provision prob-
ably is still sound. Finally, chapter 708, Married Women's Property,
was enacted in 1943 and has remained substantially unchanged. "
All these provisions should be retained.
6. Civil Rights
Jury Service. Absolute exclusion of women from jury service was
finally eliminated in the last three states in the 1960's." Florida's
law excluding women from jury service unless they affirmatively
registered was one of the last two to be eliminated.'8' Increasingly,
these obviously discriminatory measures have been replaced by ex-
emptions for child care.'82
173. Act of June 17, 1976, ch. 76-168, § 3, 1976 Fla. Laws 295.
174. Act of June 7, 1889, ch. 3864, § 47, 1889 Fla. Laws 48, 61.
175. Act of June 17, 1976, ch. 76-168, § 3, 1976 Fla. Laws 295.
176. Act of June 2, 1899, ch. 4742, § 1, 1899 Fla. Laws 129.
177. Ch. 5412, § 1, 1905 Fla. Laws 89.
178. Act of June 4, 1891, ch. 4038, § 2, 1891 Fla. Laws 64.
179. Act of June 4, 1943, ch. 21932, §§ 1-4, 1943 Fla. Laws 484.
180. Alabama's exclusion was held unconstitutional in White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401
(M.D. Ala. 1966). Mississippi amended its code in 1968. Miss. CODE ANN. § 1762 (1943), as
amended by ch. 335, § 1, 1968 Miss. Laws. South Carolina amended its code in 1967. S.C.
CODE ANN. § 38-108 (1962), as amended by 1967 S.C. Acts 895.
181. Act of June 7, 1967, ch. 67-154, § 1, 1967 Fla. Laws 313, amending FLA. STAT. §
40.01(1) (1965).
The other state was Louisiana, whose law was held unconstitutional in Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S. 522 (1975).
182. Thirteen states with such measures are: Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Massachu-
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Section 40.01(1) of the Florida Statutes provides that "expectant
mothers and mothers with children under 15 years of age, upon their
request, shall be exempted from grand and petit jury duty.' ' 3 This
provision is obviously sex-based since men having children under
fifteen in this case are prevented from taking advantage of this
exemption. Clearly, adoption of Revision No. 2 would require a
change in this section. This exemption should be made sex-neutral
as part of a general hardship exemption. The legislature should
consider various reasons for exemptions and the best method for
strict enforcement. The object must be to provide equal access to
jury service for both men and women. This alone will assure that
verdicts are rendered by a fair cross section of the community. 4
Access to the Courts. In 1926, the Florida Supreme Court identi-
fied a cause of action for the father of a minor child for loss of the
child's "custody, companionship, services, and earnings."'' 5 Nearly
half a century later, the right to sue on behalf of a minor child was
held to apply to "either the father or the mother, or to the two
parents together," necessitating a reversal of the Palm Beach
County Circuit Court.'
The circuit court had dismissed the mother as an improper party.
The Florida Supreme Court found that two sections of the Florida
Constitution-article I, section 2, providing that "[aill natural per-
sons are equal before the law," and article I, section 21, providing
that "[tihe courts shall be open to every person for redress of any
injury"-when read with the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution clearly indicate that "there can be no discrimi-
nation between the parents, based upon sex, since both are equal
in the eyes of the law."'8 7 Justice Boyd noted that "[in 1973, the
theoretical proposition that women should enjoy equal opportuni-
ties, rights, and responsibilities has been accepted.' '88
Access to the courts was extended further in 1976 in Gammon v.
Cobb. ' 9 There the Florida Supreme Court found unconstitutional
under article I, section 2 of the Florida Constitution that portion of
setts, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
and Wyoming. WOMEN's RIGH's, supra note 3, at 263.
183. (1977).
184. See Nagel & Weitzman, Women as Litigants, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 171, 192-98 (1971)
(indicating that women litigants do not receive the same treatment as men litigants).
185. Wilkie v. Roberts, 109 So. 225, 227 (Fla. 1926).
186. Yordon v. Savage, 279 So. 2d 844, 846 (Fla. 1973) (emphasis in original). See
generally Note, Article I, Section 21: Access to Courts in Florida, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 871
(1977).
187. Yordon v. Savage, 279 So. 2d 844, 846 (Fla. 1973).
188. Id. at 847.
189. 335 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 1976).
ONE SMALL WORD
section 742.011 of the Florida Statutes limiting actions to unmarried
women.'9 Gammon had long been separated (twenty years), but
never divorced, from her legal husband. In the interim she and Cobb
had had seven children. Gammon and Cobb were now separated,
and she wanted to bring an action for determination of paternity
under chapter 742 in order to require him to support his children.
The circuit court in Pinellas County dismissed the action because
section 742.011 specified that "unmarried" women could bring such
an action and Gammon was still legally married.'9 ' The court found
that the purposes of the statute were to protect the child and to
impose a support obligation on the father. Therefore, the
''relationship between the natural father and the child . . . should
be controlling rather than the marital status of the mother."'' 2
Summary. In regard to jury service, the legislature must consider
establishing a general hardship exemption from service and must
provide appropriate guidelines. Men and women must be equally
represented in jury deliberations for juries to be the representative
bodies they are supposed to be.
A reconsideration of access to courts is also in order. Article I,
section 21 of the Florida Constitution now requires the courts to be
''open to every person for redress of any injury . . . ... When read
in conjunction with Revision No. 2, more causes of action may well
be found than exist currently. Ready access to the courts by all
Florida's citizens-whether male or female-should be welcomed by
everyone.
7. Disparate Impact
Discriminatory intent in statutes and in judicial decisions is
usually rather easy to see. Discriminatory impact because of admin-
istrative practices is often more difficult to discern. One area of
possible disparate impact is sentencing and incarceration.
Disparate impact in sentencing practices usually comes in one or
both of two ways: by imposition of indeterminate sentences and by
imposition of different sentence lengths for women and men con-
victed of the same crime. Florida allows the imposition of indetermi-
nate sentences.'9 3 The annual reports of the Florida Department of
Offender Rehabilitiation'94 for about five years have not included
indeterminate sentences in the table for "Sentence Length." The
190. Id. at 268.
191. Id. at 262.
192. Id. at 268.
193. FLA. STAT. § 921.18 (1977).
194. Recently changed to the Department of Corrections.
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information is available from the department's computer, however,
and a recently prepared survey clearly indicates that on the average,
from 1959 through 1977, women received indeterminate sentences
more often than men in Florida. 1 5 This practice would not be ac-
ceptable following adoption of Revision No. 2. A solution, however,
would require more than just repealing or amending a statute.
Information regarding sentence length as a function of crime com-
mitted and sex is also not available in the department's annual
reports. A computer search is necessary. "' If Revision No. 2 is
adopted, study in this area will have to be undertaken.
Disparate impact also occurs because of the structure of the
prison system. In Florida, the major women's prison is at Lowell,
near Ocala. There are thirteen major institutions for men. "' This
means that women convicts are much more likely to be imprisoned
at considerable distances from their families. Two possible solutions
are to build more women's prisons or to integrate the male prisons.
Any solution must take into account the very great difference in
the numbers of men and women currently imprisoned. There are
more than 18,000 men and slightly more than 800 women.' 8 It may
well not be economically feasible to adopt either of those two solu-
tions. But serious study must be given to this problem.
The Department of Corrections currently operates a program
using community correctional centers (for men) and women's ad-
justment centers (for women) to ease the transition back into society
for those in the last eighteen months of their sentences.' There are
currently eight centers for women, from Tallahassee to Miami.20
This is the kind of program which is necessary to help ease the
disparate impact on women caused by incarceration far from home
and family.
This brief discussion of sentencing and incarceration suggests the
kinds of rethinking which would have to be done by state policy
makers upon adoption of Revision No. 2. Discriminatory adminis-
trative practices are not confined to the state prisons. It can safely
be said that such policies permeate the entire process of state gov-
195. Bureau of Planning, Research & Statistics, Florida Dep't of Corrections, Percentage
Distribution: Inmates Admitted with Indeterminate Sentences Since Fiscal Year 1959-60
(July 20, 1978).
196. Conversation with Gerald Smith, Bureau of Planning, Research & Statistics, Florida
Dep't of Corrections (July 21, 1978).
197. FLORIDA DEP'T OF OFENDER REHABILrrATION, ANNUAL REPORT 1976-77, at 21 (1977).
198. Id. at 61.
199. Id. at 22.
200. Florida Dep't of Corrections, Community Correctional Centers, Philosophy & Pro-
grams 2 (draft Jan. 1978).
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ernment in all its varied manifestations.
In some instances, this can be attributed to the powerful influ-
ences of sexist traditions. In others, it may only be a result of the
inertia that so commonly afflicts a bureaucracy. To be fair, it must
be acknowledged that some sexual discrimination is committed
unconsciously and without nefarious intent.
Approval of Revision no. 2 would make administrative discrimi-
nation, whether conscious or unconscious, far more difficult. The
changes which would result from popular endorsement of Revision
No. 2 might not be as apparent in our laws as in the ways our laws
are enforced.
IV. CONCLUSION
Sex discrimination is a fact of life. While great strides have been
made, both legislatively and judicially, toward reducing the severity
of this particular kind of discrimination, a great deal remains to be
done. Adoption of Revision No. 2 is necessary because legislatures
change and judges change. The fact of progress today does not en-
sure the continuation of progress tomorrow. An assurance of contin-
ued progress is needed in the state constitution.
In this article, several broad areas of substantive law have been
investigated. Florida's legislature and judiciary are to be com-
mended for the many changes made during this decade. Now is not
the time to rest, however. In 1970, nearly forty percent of the women
in Florida were part of the labor force. 20 ' The median income for
those who worked fifty to fifty-two weeks during 1969, however, was
$4,270, compared with $7,461 for men. 22 In a period when Florida's
population is expanding rapidly, its citizens cannot afford to let the
advancement toward sexual equality be slowed.
If for no other reason, Revision No. 2 should be adopted simply
as a statement of policy that half of Florida's citizens no longer can
be considered and treated as dependent and inferior beings. The
time when women were totally dependent on men has long since
passed. The notion that women are inferior does not deserve com-
ment.
Changes, but not massive ones, will be required. Many proposals
have been indicated in this note. Some others not addressed for lack
of space might also have to be made. Florida has a good beginning.
201. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULAnON: DE-
TAILED CHARACTmusTICS: FLORIDA 11-738 (1970).
202. Id. at 11-1210.
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Adoption of Revision No. 2 would provide the clear policy state-
ment needed to help women in Florida achieve the equality that is
their birthright.
